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ADVERTISING AND INTERMEDIARIES IN
PROVISION OF LEGAL SERVICES: Bates

in

Retrospect and Prospect
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. t
It is entirely fitting that serious efforts be made to assess the significance
of the revolution in lawyer advertising that resulted with the Supreme
Court's decision in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona. l That decision provided
the shield of the First Amendment free speech protection for lawyers'
efforts to make known the availability of their services to members of the
general public. The First Amendment shield still is held in place, although
with some qualifications and misgivings. Lawyer advertising evidently has
come to stay, not only in this country but also, to an increasing degree, in
other legal systems as well. 2 That being so, it is appropriate to review how
lawyer advertising has worked out and also to consider possible
developments in the future.

1.

THE BATES DECISION IN CONTEXT

The issue immediately involved in Bates was whether the general
prohibition against lawyer advertising established in the Arizona Code of
Professional Responsibility was constitutionally invalid as applied to
newspapers' advertisements that announced, in truthful terms, the
availability of basic legal services at specified modest rates. 3 There were
similar prohibitions in every state at the time. The decision came after other
decisions by the Supreme Court that had invalidated other traditional
regulations of the legal profession. Some of these other decisions responded
to cases flowing out of the desegregation after Brown v. Board of
Education. 4 Thus, NAACP v. ButtonS sharply constrained the authority of a
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See. e.g.. C.A
BAR ASS'N, CODE Of PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 51-55 (J 974)
(especially commentary); GEOffREY C. HAZARD JR. & A~(JELO DONDJ, LEGAL ETHICS A
COMPARATIVE Sn;rw 14L 271 (2004)
3.
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state to restrict provision of legal assistance in disputes over desegregation. 6
In a parallel development, Goh(farb v. Virginia State Ba/ had invalidated
schedules of recommended fees for routine legal services, on the ground
that they amounted to price-fixing in violation of the federal antitrust laws. s
In the same period, the Court had invalidated the traditional informal
disciplinary procedure employed by many bar associations, subjecting the
procedure to due process fairness standards. 9 Broadly speaking, these
developments had the cumulative effect of disestablishing the bar as a semipublic vocational fraternity and reconstituting it as a service industry
recognized as being "affected with a public interest."lo
Bates was a landmark decision in this transformation. The rule against
lawyer advertising was an article of faith within most of the bar. It had at
least two policy foundations. One was sustaining professional solidarity
within the bar, conceiving the profession as a band of brother practitioners
not in overt competition with each other. Another policy objective was
restraint against "stirring up litigation," a policy also expressed in the rules
against champerty and maintenance (prohibiting assistance to another to
s\.htain litigation), against solicitation (prohibiting lawyers from seeking out
clients), and against "ambulance chasing" (a particularly crude form of
solicitation). The American Bar Association Canons of Professional Ethics
of 1908 prohibited advertising and "all other like self-laudation"! I and
condemned stirring up litigation in most emphatic terms, reciting that: "It is
disreputable [among other things] to hunt up defects in titles ... or to breed
litigation ... for personal injuries ... or to employ agents or runners for
such purposes ...." 12 I can say from personal experience that this tradition
was still substantially in place, if imperfectly observed, in 1954, when
Brown v. Board of Education was decided and, as it happens, when I was
first admitted to the bar.
Like other landmark decisions, Bates had to be explicated and massaged
in subsequent decisions. These decisions included Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
.4ss 'n,13 upholding the rule against personal solicitation of a personal injury

fd. at 429.
421 U.S. 773 (1975).
8.
fd. at 792-93.
9.
fn re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544,550 (1968).
10. The phrase was employed notably in t'dunn v. flIinois, 94 U.S. 113. 126 (1876), one of
many cases in the evolution of the relationship between government regulatory authority and the
principle of due process.
11. ABA CANONS OF PROF'!. ETHICS 672 (1908) [hereinafter 1908 ABA CANONS].
12. fd
] 3. 436 U. S. 447 ( I9]X ).
6.
7.
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prospective client while in the hospital,14 In re Primus,15 protecting personal
solicitation in civic-minded solicitation in civil rights cases,lo and Zauderer
v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,17 holding that First Amendment
protection extended to targeted advertisements-addressing specific types
of legal matters-in print media. 18 More recently, in Florida Bar v. Went
For It, Inc.]9 the Court has sustained a prohibition on communication with
prospective personal injury clients within thirty days of the accident. 20
The pulling and hauling and zigging and zagging involved in this
evolution seem to me not atypical of constitutional doctrine. The rules
goveming lawyer advertising apparently now boil down to this: lawyers Call
advertise and solicit by mail (and presumably e-mail), but not in-person
contact, as long as they do so truthfully and do not rush prospective clients
in personal injury and wrongful death cases. 21 Within those limits lawyers
can rely on affiliations, such as those with labor unions, to encourage
referrals.
However, along the way Justice O'Connor gave voice for herself and
others to a concem widely shared in the bench and bar about the effects of
advertising on the profession. In a dissent in Shapero v. Kentucky Bar
Ass 'n,22 on behalf of herself, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Scalia, she
lamented:
The best arguments in favor of rules permitting attorneys to
advertise are founded in elementary economic principles.
. . . The economic argument against these restrictions
ignores the delicate role they may play in preserving the norms of
the legal profession.
. . . One distinguishing feature of any profession ... is that
membership entails an ethical obligation to temper one's selfish
pursuit of economic success by adhering to standards of conduct
that could not be enforced either by legal fiat or through the
discipline of the market. ... [S]pecial ethical standards for lawyers
are properly understood as an appropriate means of restraining
14.
15.
16.
17.

Jd. at 468.
436U.S.412(J978).
Jd. at 432.
471 U.S 626(1985)
18 Jd at 646--47: see also Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n. 486 U.S. 466 . 473-74 (I98X)
(discussing "targeted" mai I in nonpersonal inj ury matters).
19. SIS U.S 618 (1995)
20. !d at 635.
21. The summary in CIIARU'S WOLFRAM. MODER!\ LFG,\L ETHICS § 14.2 (1986) remains
essentially accurate.
22. 486 U.S. 466 (I nR)
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lawyers in the exercise of the unique power that they inevitably
23
wield in a political system like ours.

I will come back to this thoughtful statement presently.
II.

LAWYER ADVERTISING HERE AND

Now

The aim of the Bates and O'Steen law firm was laudable. Indeed, it was
in furtherance of a purpose long-pronounced by the legal profession that
legal services be available to everyone. It was thus consistent with the
principle of legal aid and the rule that lawyers should accept appointments
to represent indigent defendants in criminal cases. Advertising would
augment the information available through the traditional medium of local
reputation. In an increasingly urbanized and impersonal world, there was an
increasingly felt need for some such mechanisms. It was recognized, though
somewhat dimly within the profession, that ordinary citizens typically had
only occasional need of a lawyer. Hence, the ordinary individual would not
have personal experience or acquaintance with lawyers to bring to bear
when need arose, and hence could be help~d by access to additional
information. 24
Under the shelter of constitutional protection, lawyer advertising has
evolved along two general lines. The first consists of forms of advertising
directed at what can be called the mass market. The second consists of
forms of advertising in the market for business legal services. It is useful to
consider the difference between the techniques involved.

A. Mass Market Advertising
The most common fonn of mass market advertisements are those now
familiar in the yellow pages in virtually every American community. In
some states, including Arizona, billboard advertising is also prominent,
responding to the importance of life on the freeway in newer metropolitan
areas. In some states, television is used by some law firms, but, because
dramatization has been prohibited, television advertisements are essentially
similar to the placards in the yellow pages.
There appears to be a strong similarity in the content of yellow page
advertising across the country. The basic elements are: (1) addressing legal
23.
24.

fd at 488-89 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
The rationale is stated in Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et aI., Why Lawyers Should Be
AI!()l,rcd to Advertise: A Market Analysis of Legal Services, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1084, Ion
(1983 l. cited by Justice O'Connor in her dissent in Shapero, 486 U.S. at 488.
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needs of individuals as distinct from businesses; (2) itemizing legal needs
commonly encountered by ordinary individuals; and (3) offering free first
consultation and, in personal injury cases, no fee unless there is a recovery
by settlement or judgment. The "menu" of commonly encountered legal
needs generally includes: personal injury, including workers' compensation;
traffic offenses, including license revocation; criminal defense; divorce and
child custody; bankruptcy; and social security.
All these categories have substantial prospect of being paying cases for
private practitioners. The types most frequently and loudly advertised are
personal injury, where the contingent fee is the standard basis of
engagement, with bankruptcy perhaps second, where a lawyer's fee has
priority among the creditors. In both of these types, therefore, the prospect
of return for the lawyer is especially strong.
There is nothing wrong in this, because, of course, advertising is
conducted by members of the private bar. Members of the private bar
handle some matters "pro bono," typically in situations where they had
hoped to get paid but did not. However, la\vyers in private practice have to
get fees. Since the private bar depends on paying cases to continue in
practice, private practitioners must aim at attracting fee-paying business.
However, the conjunction of First Amendment free speech for lawyer
advertising and the use of advertising to get legal cases with payoff prospect
is unattractive. It is inconsistent with the vision of the lawyers involved in
Bates, who aspired to bring equal justice at low cost to people not served
through the conventional bar. It is dissonant with the Supreme Court's
vision in In re Primus, where the Court addressed "outreach" by lawyers in
civil rights cases. 25 And the aggressive solicitation of personal injury cases
is a rejection of what Justice O'Connor referred to as the traditional "ethical
obligation to temper one's selfish pursuit of economic success."~h
Moreover, the approach to personal injury claims in lawyer advertising
invites prospective clients to consider a personal injury claim as an
economic opportunity rather than a personal misfortune. That approach is
certainly inconsistent with the "traditional view of professional life" that
Justice O'Connor had in mind. 27
Yet in a less genteel view of our economic and political system, yellow
page advertising reflects realities of life for most ordinary citizens who
encounter legal problems. The content of contemporary yellow pages is the
product of trial and error by lawyers in finding what works in the way of
attracting clientele. The result is that legal advertising in the mass market
25.
26.
27.

436 C.S. 412. 430-31 (1978).
Shapero. 486 US. at 488 (O'Connor. J.. dissenting).
!d at 489 (O'Connor, 1., dissenting).
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docs not consist of lofty appeals to justice or legal principles. Instead, it is
messages that are, in the words Thomas Hobbes employed in another
connection, "nasty, brutish, and short." These messages in lawyer
advertising evidently respond to the experience with legal problems as they
are encountered by most ordinary individuals. In contrast, the understanding
of legal problems by most members of the legal profession is captured in
inscription such as that on the mantle of the Supreme Court: "Equal Justice
for All."
Although advertising "brutish and short" is apparently here to stay, a lot
of lawyer "outreach" to ordinary individual clients continues to be carried
out in the old-fashioned way: word-of-mouth through family, friends, and
aquaintances at the workplace; labor union connections in unionized
employments; churches; and social groups, etc. These networks between
lawyers and prospective clients are extended through networks among
general practice lawyers, who are approached by the clients, and specialist
lawyers, in such fields as personal injury and divorce, to whom substantial
cases are often referred. In the transfer of law business through these
networks, a referral payoff is usually involved from the receiving lawyer to
the sender. That, too, is unattractive and sometimes abusive, but it does
result in the cases being put in experienced professional hands. Given the
wide range of competence within the practicing bar, on balance that is
probably a social good.

B. Business-Directed Lawyer "Outreach"
There is another side of law practice, of course, commonly called
corporate law. Something like half of the revenue received by lawyers in
modem American law practice is in return for assistance to business and
nonprofit enterprises, both large and small. The organization of corporate
law practice runs from very large continental and international law firms
with hundreds or even thousands of lawyers to small firms and even solo
practitioners. The large firms do almost all kinds of business and
commercial work, while the smaller ones either serve small businesses or
specialize in narrow specialties in practice fed largely by referrals. At the
same time, there has been a steady expansion of corporate law departments
in businesses and nonprofits of all sizes and in all fields of endeavor. Today,
most corporate law practice engagements are accomplished between more
or less sophisticated agents on behalf of clients dealing with lawyers who
are engaged in relatively specialized subject matter.
in relationships of this kind, mass market advertising is not to be found.
indeed, that approach to prospective clientele would be unproductive or
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even counterproductive. Sophisticated clients know what they want, or at
least believe they know. What they want is competent technical legal
assistance, at the ready, unconflicted by other engagements, and available at
a negotiated price that they consider reasonable. Yellow pages, billboards,
and the like cannot convey that information. What does convey that
information is past performance, reputation, and specifications of
professional competence.
Accordingly, lawyer "outreach" aimed at corporate and nonprofit
clientele is tailored to meet these requirements. In contemporary corporate
law practice, past performance and reputation function substantially as they
have in smaller communities in the past. The foundational requirement is
doing a good job in matters that have come to the office. A secondary
requirement, sometimes a primary one, is that the client understand and
believe that a good job has been done. On that basis, it is projected that the
client will remember the experience positively and will tell others. The
mechanism is unsystematic but general1y effective. That is what
professional reputation is "about," in the contemporary phrase.
The modem methods of client outreach in corporate practice build on
this traditional mechanism. These methods seek to convey specifications of
professional competence, thus reinforcing the presumed effect of positive
reputation and perhaps moderating the effects of negative reputation. Thus,
professional outreach toward business clients involves brochures.
newsletters, and recounting types of matters and clients or types of clients
that the firm considers it has successfully handled. It includes direct
solicitation, such as "beauty contests" in which a firm makes an organized
presentation to a client of its special fitness to handle a legal situation. It
involves participation by firm lawyers at trade association meetings and
other open forums where attention of representatives of prospective clients
can be attracted. It involves participation in civic activities, such a~
charitable boards and task forces, with the same effect. It can still include
golf outings.
These means of outreach are not much different in style from the
decorous forms of outreach in the earlier and gentler era to which Justice
O'Connor referred. In substance, they have much more content than the
"old boy" techniques. The "old boy" techniques have not disappeared, and
women and minority members of our profession are rightly wonied that
they are at disadvantage in their use. But verifiable technical competence is
now a necessary concomitant of "old boy" connections in the successful
marketing of professional services, not only in law practice but also
financial advice, accounting, and other specialized vocations. Al1 such
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relationships now are "rational" rather than merely "traditional," to use the
terminology of the famous sociologist Max Weber.2~
The differences in marketing practice for legal services, between mass
marketing and corporate practice outreach, substantially correspond to the
differences in the "hemispheres" within the legal profession itself between
lawyers who service individuals and lawyers engaged in corporate practice.
These hemispheres, or levels of stratification, were clearly and
systematically identified over two decades ago by John Heinz and Edward
Laumann. 29 If anything, they appear to have become more distinct since
then.
Thus, the difference in the media by which lawyers typically seek to
attract clientele corresponds to differences in the clientele being served and
the kind of law being practiced.
There is little concern today about the capacity of business and other
organizations to obtain competent legal services appropriate to their needs,
at prices in line with those expected in an open market. In fact, the market
for corporate law services is open, broadly diverse, and highly competitive.
On the other hand, all observers seriously concerned with the ideal of
"equal justice for all" remain concerned about the adequacy of legal
services for ordinary citizens. That was the concern animating the Bates and
O'Steen law firm thirty years ago. That concern was legitimate then and
r~mams so.

III. INFORMATION, INTERMEDIARIES, AND THE
DEMAND FOR LEGAL SERVICES

The theory underlying protection of lawyer advertising is that freer
provision of information about legal services would yield better information
to consumers, that better information would yield better decisionmaking in
selection of lawyers, and that better decisionmaking would have the result
that "legal needs" would be better met. However, there is reason to doubt
that the market for legal services is adequate for this purpose. Indeed, there
is every reason to think that the market is inadequate for this purpose. That
conclusion should not be a stepping stone to reimposing restrictions on legal
advertising, at least not for me. Rather, it is a stepping stone in considering
whether other changes might be made.

28. See MAX WEBER, ESSAYS [N Eco OMIC SOCIOLOGY passim (Richard Swedberg ed.,
1998) (compiling the works of Max Weber).
29. JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD O. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE
OF THE BAR 319-85 (1982).
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Two other changes come to mind. The first change would be on the
"supply" side of the market and would be a repeal or reform of restrictions
on "intermediaries." By "intermediaries" I mean institutions or networks of
information channels between prospective clients, on one hand, and lawyers
positioned to provide legal services for ordinary citizens, on the other hand.
The second change would be on the focused and sustained efforts to reduce
the complexity of the legal system as it interfaces with ordinary citizens.

A. Intermediaries
Along with the rules against advertising and solicitation has been a longestablished prohibition on "intermediaries" between prospective clients and
legal services. That prohibition was stated and argued in Canon 35 of the
ABA Canons ofProfessional Ethics, as follows:
The professional services of a lawyer should not be controlled
or exploited by any lay agency, personal or corporate, which
intervenes between client and lawyer .... A lawyer's relation to
his client should be personal, and the responsibility should be
direct to the client ....
A lawyer may accept employment from any organization ... to
render legal services in any matter in which the organization, as an
entity, is interested, but the employment should not include ...
legal services ... to the members ... in respect to their individual
affairs. 30

There was an interjection in Canon 35 that "[cJharitable services rendering
aid to the indigents are not deemed such intermediaries.,,3
In the 1970 ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility, this
prohibition was divided into two concepts. One was the independence of
professional judgment, the other the prohibition on unauthorized practice of
law. Concerning independence of professional judgment, DR 5-107(B)
provided: "A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs,
or pays him to render legal services for another to direct or regulate his
professional judgment in rendering such legal services.,,32
Explicitly, this provision of the Code was affirming a long-standing and
accepted principle of law practice, elaborated in the rules against conflict of
interest. Implicitly, DR 5-107(B) recognized that many inroads had been
made on the prohibition against lay intermediaries. The most conspicuous
J

30.
3J.
32.

1908 ABA CA~01\S. supra note 11, at 679-80.
ld at 680.
ABA MODEL COD I-: OF PROF'L RESPONSlBlLlTY DR 5-107(8) (1983).
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inroad was the firmly established practice whereby liability insurers
engaged, paid, and, to some extent, controlled lawyers to represent insureds
in defense of automobile accident claims, products liability claims, and
other tort claims. Another less conspicuous inroad was the advice and
assistance service provided by trade associations, professional
organizations, and labor unions to their individual members, for instance in
tax and rcgulatory matters. Another was the provision of personal legal
assistance to corporate management personnel by law firms engaged by
corporations and, especially in smaller companies, by corporate law
departments.
Concerning unauthorized practice of law, the Code of Professional
Responsibility, being a regulation of lawyers, could only address lawyers'
conduct concerning that activity. DR 3-101 (A) accordingly provided: "A
lawyer shall not aid a non-lawyer in the unauthorized practice of law.,,33
However, the bar had long been supportive of statutory prohibitions against
unauthorized practice of law in the various states. State bars had also
maintained standing committees on unauthorized practice to monitor
compliance with these statutes. These statutes prohibited corporations and
other associations from engaging in the "practice of law," and interpreted
the "practicc of law" to include various law-related services that lawyers
sought to provide. 34 The "heavy lifting" against lay intermediaries thus was
done under the rubric and institutional mechanism of unauthorized practice
of law.
The effectiveness of these prohibitions was and is often debatable, given
the very indeterminacy of the concept of "practice of law" as applied to
legally significant activities of people who are not lawyers. It is not an
exaggeration to say that, in today's world, any white collar work above the
level of clerk or secretary requires awareness of legal rules and to that
extcnt their interpretation and administration. However, the prohibition has
scared off banks, insurance companies and agencies, financial managers,
~nd unions, from openly becoming "lay intermediaries" that provide advice
and assistance tailored to the needs of ordinary citizens. Other organizations
in similar strategic positions include corporations concerning their
employees; schools and universities concerning the faculty, staff, and
students; interest groups such as AARP (American Association of Retired

33.
34.

Jd. DR 3-101(A).
See, e.g, Perkins

CTX Mortgage Co., 969 P.2d 93, 97 (Wash. 1999); GEOFFREY C
991-1013 (3d ed. 1999). See
generallv Deborah Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical
Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STA . L REV. 1 (1981).
Y.
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Persons); and professional associations, indeed such as the American Bar
Association and the Arizona State Bar.
It should be a premise that every kind of legal assistance provided by any
such organization should meet general standards of competence, loyalty,
and confidentiality that lawyers in independent practice are required to
observe. 35 Most obviously, a corporate law department providing service to
corporate employees, for example, could not provide advice or assistance in
claims against the company_ But there is no reason why such a department
could not refer such cases to outside lawyers specializing in the
employment law field, just as lawyers in independent practice refer matters
out when confronted by conflicts of interest.
The justification for legitimating "lay intermediaries" is essentially the
same as that involved in Bates, namely free communication of information.
From the viewpoint of a prospective client, a lay intermediary is a source of
information as much as the yellow pages or a television advertisement:
indeed a much better source. The lay intermediary might well be a lawyer JI1
the employ of the intermediary organization. The lawyer could be supported
by paralegals and connected to specialists in other fields, such as pension
plans and health care resources. A person affiliated with the organization
would thus have someone to tum to when confronted with one of the many
kinds of legal problems addressed in yellow page advertising, or other more
exotic legal fields-immigration, environmental law (an oil tank in my from
yard!), etc. The resource person would be a first-line diagnostician.
emergency law-care provider, and referral director.
Essentially this kind of assistance is now provided in connection with
liability insurance, where the insurance company functions as a lay
intermediary. It is provided to top management in many companies for their
pension and employment matters, with the corporation acting as the
intermediary. It is provided by trade associations and unions, which no
longer avoid assistance to members "in respect to their individual affairs. "'/1
What is wrong with similar assistance for Joe and Ms. Sixpack? And for
many of the rest of us?
In a functional perspective, the traditional prohibitions on lawyer
advertising were complementary with the prohibitions on lay
intennediaries. Both presupposed that a proper client-lawyer relationship
had to be one-to-one between client and lawyer. They both presupposed that
the relationship was established on the basis of information encapsulated in
the lawyer's reputation. They assumed that clients could adequately identify
35. See Perkins, 969 P.2d at 100 (holding that "lenders must comply with the standards of
care of a practicing attomey when preparing [legal] documents").
36. This is the fomlulation in old Canon 35. See supra note 30 and accompanying tC'xt.
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when they should seek out a lawyer, as distinct from seeking some other
kinds of assistance or intelligently deciding to do nothing. They assumed
that clients were aware of reputations and could, on that basis, distinguish
among potential sources of legal assistance. They assumed that the general
impression of competence conveyed in a professional reputation sufficiently
identified a lawyer who could properly undertake their matter.
These assumptions may have made sense in Abe Lincoln's time,
although there is reason to be skeptical on that score. However, virtually all
these assumptions are untenable in a world of freeways and cell phones and
populations that relocate about every five years. In any event, intermediaries
surely could help most ordinary individuals in seeking legal assistance, with
risks no more obvious than in those that we have learned to live with in the
insurer-insured-lawyer "triangle."
Of course, many lawyers fear that their practice would be infringed
through competition from lawyers employed by intermediaries. That fear
certainly is rational. It is another matter whether it is a proper basis for
public policy concerning the legal needs of ordinary individuals.
B. Legal Simplification

.There is still another kind of change that could be made: namely,
changing the law to make it simpler for ordinary individuals. The concept of
"'access to justice" implicitly assumes that what the law has to offer for the
ordinary citizen is static, or at least that the content of the law is a variable
that need not be taken into account. But the law could be reshaped with an
eye to making it less complex, if less "flexible" and less finely calibrated to
distinctions. A prime example is the tax law. One can imagine a tax system
in which, for most people, federal taxes on income, including Social
Security, are completely integrated with state taxes and covered by a single
return. One can imagine rights to unemployment compensation and
pensions being integrated. Such a scheme for health care was largely
worked out during the Clinton administration.
A law reform program along these lines would be a major undertaking,
in both technical and political terms. The basic idea is contrary to two
premises that dominate law making in the American system. One is reliance
on individual citizen choice, understood as free choice in a market system,
to select the array of goods and services purveyed to each household. The
second is to facilitate wide differentiation in the goods and services that are
purveyed, in principle a market with only minimal regulation.
In general, I share those premises. However, some markets do not work
as well as others.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The supply of legal problems presented to ordinary individuals in our
society can be said to be vastly greater than it need be. The procedures by
which ordinary individuals try to deal with these problems are expensive
and complex and often frustrating. The pathway to change in the methods of
providing legal assistance has been pretty well stagnated since the liberation
of lawyer advertising. That mechanism seems somewhat helpful but
nevertheless inadequate to the purpose.

